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The effect of industry delocalization on global energy use: A global sectoral perspective
Introduction
In order to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation targets as formulated in the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) , emission reductions will be necessary across all sectors of the global economy. While a first best climate policy, i.e. putting a uniform, global price on carbon would ensure that improvement potentials in economic sectors are realized in the most cost-efficient way (Weitzman, 2014) , it is rather unlikely to unfold in the near future (Cramton et al., 2017; Edenhofer et al., 2015; MacKay et al., 2015) .
Differing ambition levels of unilateral climate policies are feared to induce competitiveness 1 losses for implementing regions Quirion, 2015, 2014; Carbone and Rivers, 2017) and carbon leakage (see e.g., Jakob et al. 2014 ) through different channels (Carbone and Rivers, 2017; Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017) . Inter alia, energy-and emission intensive trade exposed industries (EITE) (Carbone and Rivers, 2017) , such as steel or aluminum could see large increases in relative production prices (Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012; Böhringer et al., 2012) , and hence reor delocalize to regions that have less ambitious regulations and less efficient production technologies in place. Thus, a higher price of emission-intensive goods in one region could inter alia lead to increased imports from non-regulated regions (Markusen 1975 , Siebert 1979 , an effect that potentially supports pollution havens (Cole et al., 2006; Dietzenbacher and Mukhopadhyay, 2007; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003) .
As no natural counterfactual to policies exists, and effects, which are difficult to isolate, are likely heterogeneous across countries, it is difficult to explicitly evaluate policy impacts (Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017) . Reviewing the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling literature on impacts of unilateral climate policy, Carbone and Rivers (2017) find evidence for resulting negative effects on output, exports and employment as well as carbon leakage. Nevertheless, it has been argued that depending on the rate of technological spillover and the additional technological development caused by environmental regulations, the effects of (carbon) leakage could be more than offset (Gerlagh and Kuik, 2014) . Literature also acknowledged that depending on relocation barriers, domestic effects might be more relevant than effects between countries (Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017) . For instance, the US clean air act had no impact on the cement industry, i.e. relocation of production capacities, but contributed to large health benefits (Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017) . In the same vein, the introduction of EU ETS has not led to measurable effects for the overall economy (Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017) . In specific cases, environmental legislation can also increase firm profits, as Branger and Quirion (2015) show for the European cement industry. Nevertheless, considering the findings of Carbone and Rivers (2017) , it is conceivable that unilateral climate policy can negatively affect EITE-sectors and hence be relevant for delocalization of production capacities.
Thus far, delocalization effects have mainly been explored at aggregated economic level. Voigt et al. (2014) and Löschel et al. (2015) have decomposed the structural component of energy intensity changes into a between-and a within-country structural effect. Both studies show that while a shift towards a less energy intensive economic structure is at work in most countries, the delocalization of production (between-country structural effect) partly compensates for this development. Although drivers of changes in emissions have been investigated at sectoral level, see e.g. Branger and Quirion (2015) , and predictions have been made using CGE modelling 3 (Carbone and Rivers, 2017) , an empirical investigation of sector-specific delocalization effects is currently missing.
In this study we aim to close this gap. We apply an advanced Logarithmic Mean Divisa Index (LMDI) decomposition methodology (Ang and Wang, 2015) to decompose energy use into value added, technological progress 2 and delocalization along sectoral lines of the economy. Our analysis is based on data from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), for the years 2001 , 2004 , 2007 (Dimaranan, 2006 Narayanan et al., 2015) (details in Section 2), which allows to track changes over time. We consider 57 different sectors and up to 140 regions, which we transfer into a multi-regional input-output table (Andrew and Peters, 2013) . We are interested in how delocalization effected the energy consumption of global sectors. Here, we understand delocalization as a relative shift of production capacities between countries for single sectors. We assume that if production technologies in two country were different and a relative shift in production capacities occurred, the global average technology and consequently the sectoral energy consumption changed. Our analysis uses these changes and gives indirect evidence when and in which sectors delocalization occurred.
We find that the increases of value added have consistently driven energy use at the sectoral level, while technological change has continuously led to decreases in energy use in the decade 2001-2011. We find evidence for ongoing sectoral delocalization. For most sectors, delocalization increases sectoral energy use by 1-6% per year. Delocalization effects have increased sharply in manufacturing industries that consume more than 50% of the global energy after 2004. 2 We use the energy intensity improvement rate to approximate technological progress. We use energy use per value added (VAD). Production chains are increasingly globalizing and fragmenting (Baldwin and Martin, 1999; Koopman et al., 2014; Timmer et al., 2014) . It is hence important to adequately measure the contribution of single production steps. In contrast to output, VAD allows to reflect the significance and efficiency of a production step, i.e.
how much additional value is generated from the inputs.
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Subsequently, technological progress rates within manufacturing sectors have declined (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) .
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and the methodological foundations of the decomposition analysis. Section 3 provides the results for different sectoral aggregation levels. Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
Data and Methodology
This section develops a framework that allows identifying delocalization between countries at sectoral level. In contrast to former studies, which have focused on energy intensity in countries or regions, we consider sectoral value added and its distribution, which is decisive considering total energy use-driven GHG emissions. We decompose sectoral energy intensity changes into delocalization and technology components, envisaging the delocalization component as being the structural effect within sectors and between countries.
Data
For our analysis we use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Data Base. The GTAP Data Base can be converted into a multi-regional input-output table (Peters et al., 2011) , which allows to calculate sectoral value-added. In contrast to other multi-regional input-output datasets, such as Eora (Lenzen et al., 2013) and WIOD (Timmer et al., 2015) , there are no annual releases of the GTAP Data Base. However, it does provide relatively high sectoral and regional resolutions (homogeneous across regions) (Tukker and Dietzenbacher, 2013) , which are crucial for investigating delocalization effects, along with data on energy use. 
Factorizing sectoral energy intensity changes with Index Decomposition Analysis
In order to analyze the impact of delocalization on sectoral energy usage trends, we take the perspective of global production sectors, adapting and modifying the decomposition methodology by Ang and Wang (2015) . Let denote the set of considered sectors and the set of considered regions in a dataset. With we denote energy usage in the global sector ∈ at time ; , refers to the energy usage of sector in region ∈ at time . With we denote the value-added of the global sector at time , while , refers to the valueadded of sector in region at time . can thus be decomposed in the following way:
(1)
The first component of the right side of equation (1), , = , is the share of the global valueadded of sector that is created in region at time . This factor is novel to energy usage decomposition studies as it analyses the effect of shifts in the location of production within a global sector on energy usage. In the following we call factor the localization factor, the 6 change in localization will be denoted as delocalization. The second term , = , , is the sectoral energy intensity of sector in region at time . We call this term the technology factor. The third term refers to the economic size of the global sector, as it considers total value added.
Calculating the effects on energy usage change: Log Mean Divisia Index method
The factorization of energy use, as in equation (1), represents a static perspective at a given point in time. Our approach aims to derive the temporal variation of sectoral value added, energy efficiency developments and production locations. To comply with this dynamic approach, we apply the additive Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index method (LMDI) to equation (1) (Ang and Wang, 2015) .
We use the logarithmic weight function according to Ang and Wang (2015) :
We obtain -analogously to Ang and Wang (2015) and Ang (2015) -the global changes in energy usage which are assigned to the factors , and between two points in time 0 and 1 :
).
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The total of these three contributions give the overall absolute change in energy use of the global sector s between time t0 and t1
Outcomes of Equations (3) to (5) To avoid misinterpretation, it is important to note that the relative delocalization effect described by a change in the localization factor is not equivalent to the usual meaning of delocalization.
In fact, the data used in this paper do not allow the tracking of displacement of single organizations at micro level. What we observe are changes in the proportion of regional production of the global sector and its relationship to the sectoral energy usage. Put another way, the localization factor indicates whether production shares of a sector has moved, between 0 and 1 , to more (or less) energy-intensive countries.
3 Results
In this section we first introduce selected stylized facts and major trends. We then continue with detailed results of our sectoral decomposition, which was introduced in detail in Section 2.
Stylized facts and major trends
Looking at aggregated energy use patterns across the globe, we observe a major shift of regional weights, see In fast growing developing countries energy consumption has grown disproportionally in every macro sector 4 , see Figure 2 . When assessing the proportion of regional consumption by macro sector, the share of consumption in "Heavy-", and "Light Manufacturing", "Utilities and 3 See Appendix table A3 for an overview of regions and countries.
4 Note that we separate between aggregated "macro" sectors and "micro" sectors that are further disaggregated. Table A2 gives a full list of sectors and how they are aggregated into "macro" sectors. 
Decomposition
In order to understand the energy consumption patterns observed, we apply the decomposition technique described in Section 2. Results are summarized in Figure 3 . For all macro sectors, growth in the sectoral value added factor contributed to increases in energy usage. On average, its effect on energy use was 3-7% per year. The largest average contributions (10-15%) were observed in the "Heavy Manufacturing" and "Extraction" sectors. The increase in the latter could be a side effect of increases in the former, as extracted resources are relevant inputs for "Heavy Manufacturing". In contrast, technological improvements have constantly led to decreasing energy consumption, almost equating to the increases from value added contributions. For the entire period, delocalization has shown to have smaller impacts (<5%). Only one sector, "Grains and Crops", saw decreases in energy consumption due to delocalization. In contrast, two of the three most important energy consuming macro sectors, "Utilities and Construction" and "Transport and Communication" witnessed a growth in delocalization-driven energy use. As both macro sectors largely reflect infrastructure, the observed delocalization could be driven by large (necessary) investments to build-up and improve infrastructure in China, India and other Asian economies (Schäfer, 2005; Steckel et al., 2013; Steinberger et al., 2010) , which is already provided in OECD countries.
Investigating delocalization for macro sectors in more detail, i.e. considering all periods separately, reveals a different picture, see Figure 4 . by observed structural changes in economies (Voigt et al., 2014) and the decline in US manufacturing (Acemoglu et al., 2016) . They might be inter alia related to an increasing competitiveness of Asian economies in manufacturing sectors (McMillan et al., 2014; Rodrik, 2015) .
Assessing contributions of change in technology at a more detailed level by increasing the temporal resolution, see Figure 5 , shows a rather constant cross-sectoral contribution of energy efficiency improvements to the decrease in energy use. Even though some variance exists, only "Utilities and Construction", "Textiles and Wearing
Apparel", "Grains and Crops" and "Processed Food" have a single period of positive contributions to energy consumption through changing technology. They are the only macro sectors that have seen a change in trend. Some sectors have experienced constantly decreasing improvement rates, i.e. "Extraction" and "Other services". A recent decline in the improvement rate of more than 8 percentage points in "Heavy Manufacturing" is particular interesting in this respect as it is the largest energy consuming macro sector (~50% of world energy consumption). Note that in addition to this trend the delocalization factor for the same sector contributes to increases in energy intensities since 2004 (see also Figure 4 ).
As the macroeconomic sectors consist of multiple, non-homogeneous sectors, with contrasting shares of energy consumption, see Figure 2 and Table A3 , a more detailed investigation is indispensable to understand observed developments at the macro sectoral level. Investigating the most relevant macro sector "Heavy Manufacturing" in more detail, see Table 2 , we find substantial internal heterogeneity across the effects. While the dominant sector "Petroleum and
Coal Products" has shown very little changes due to delocalization 7 , all other sectors except for "Mineral Products nec"'s first period, i.e. "Chemical, Rubber and Plastics", "Ferrous Metals", Also for other macro sectors, delocalization is relevant at the sub level. For the second and third most energy consuming macro sectors, i.e. "Utilities and Construction" and "Transportation and
Communications", the subsectors "Electricity", "Construction", "Water" and "Communication"
show continuously increasing energy consumption due to delocalization. That corresponds to more than 40% of global annual energy use and illustrates that delocalization is a relevant issue. In total, we observe that over the period 23 out of 57 GTAP sectors have constantly contributed to growing energy consumption due to delocalization. Seven sectors have constantly contributed to increases greater than 3%: "Ferrous metals", "Machinery and Equipment", "Construction", "Communication", "Motor Vehicles and Parts", "Dwellings" and "Transport Equipment". In contrast, only two sectors have demonstrated a constant decrease in their energy consumption due to delocalization: "Oil seeds" and "Sugar", possibly because of delocalization towards more productive regions, i.e. Brazil in case of "Oil seeds" (Bustos et al., 16 2016) . The more detailed decomposition of micro sectors (see Table 2 Table A3 in the Appendix).
continuously been the dominating factor and boosted overall energy use. This effect is partly counterbalanced by technological improvements, which have, however, decelerated over time, at least for most energy intensive sectors. Although delocalization does not show a clear crosssectoral trend, in most sectors it has increased energy consumption within the range of 1-6% per annum. This holds especially for sectors with high overall energy consumption.
Manufacturing sectors show a strong increase in production shares in more energy-intensive regions since 2004. More specifically, "Ferrous metals", "Machinery and Equipment", "Construction", "Communication", "Motor Vehicle and Parts", "Dwellings" and "Transport
Equipment" have experienced constant annual delocalization-driven increases of energy use by more than 3% per annum for the entire period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . It is important to note that those manufacturing sectors are among the most flexible in terms of production location in the global economy (McMillan et al., 2014; Rodrik, 2015) . Production can hence adjust relatively easily to changes in political or economic framework conditions. This could imply that an increasing segregation of climate policy across the world might well accelerate the delocalization of energyintensive sectors from regulated towards non-regulated regions, leading to overall increasing energy demand and hence emissions. At least, our results give no indication that a stronger delocalization trend, which could be caused by environmental regulation, increases energy intensity improvement rates, as theoretically laid out by Gerlagh and Kuik (2014) and Grubb et al. (2002) .
It is important to note that from a global perspective it seems as technological improvement rates in some manufacturing sectors also slow down in subsequence of delocalization, see Table 2 . This coincides with technological research capacities and abilities to adopt efficient technologies being (currently) mainly located in industrialized countries (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2013 (Dechezleprêtre et al., , 2011 Bank, 2017)) and led to declines in oil prices (Nasdaq, 2017) could have had relevant influence on the observed decline in energy intensity improvement rates (Csereklyei et al., 2016; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011 ).
The applied approach allows to identify the pure sectoral relative delocalization effects within single sectors 9 , which has not been done before. However, our analysis does not allow to give an ex-post explanation for the effects observed. 10 Nevertheless, multiple theoretical explanations and channels have been identified (Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017 ). An approximate understanding of potential policy impacts and their dynamics can currently only be gained by the application and evaluation of CGE models (Carbone and Rivers, 2017) .
Considering the ambitious climate mitigation targets laid down in the Paris Agreement it is important to understand how the impacts associated to observed delocalization can be alleviated.
Targeting emissions in specific economic sectors across all countries (or at least a relevant set of countries, e.g. within the G20) might be an effective and feasible second best option for climate policy as long as no global approach exists. Negotiations on specific targets or regulations could be faster and implementation easier compared to economy wide approaches (Ahman et al., 2016; den Elzen et al., 2008; Kuik et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2008) . Such mitigation strategies might be 20 particularly feasible for manufacturing sectors, which are both prone to delocalization, responsible for a large share of energy consumption and show large efficiency variations across countries (Kim and Kim, 2012; Saygin et al., 2011) . Given that manufacturing sectors also imply significant energy consumption in their supply chains, targeting selected energy intensive sectors might imply significant reductions in both, energy consumption and emissions in upstream sectors (Ward et al., 2017) .
How to organize and incentivize intra-sectoral technology transfer is open to debate. Targeted development assistance and foreign direct investments could foster technological progress in developing countries (Javorcik, 2004; Peterson, 2008) . One additional possibility would be to make entire sectors (e.g., in the form of industry associations) eligible for climate finance, for instance to enforce sector wide efficiency standards (Saygin et al., 2011) or targeted technological access (United Nations, 1992). Nevertheless, intellectual property rights in developing countries that have been identified as a major obstacle to technological progress and diffusion of efficient technologies will have to improve (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2013) .
Carbon tariffs are frequently proposed to tackle delocalization resulting from environmental regulation, more specifically emission leakage (Böhringer et al., 2012) . Our results do not necessarily support this claim. They do not allow to disentangle whether observed delocalization is caused by existing differences in environmental regulation (Jakob et al., 2014) , differences in productivity as described by Rodrik (2015) , ongoing fragmentation and specialization in global supply networks (Timmer et al., 2014) or differing regional growth dynamics leading to relative shifts in the production network (Voigt et al., 2014) . Further, it is unclear whether delocalizing sectors are primarily producing for export or for domestic demand (Jakob et al. 2013 
